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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Brandon Kyle Rowley, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for possession of methamphetamine in a 
drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i), - 4 (a) (i) (West Supp. 2007).! This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e).2 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does an official search of a truck, after private parties entered the truck, 
found incriminating items, and revealed the presence of those items to law 
Section 58-37-8, but not the cited subsections, has subsequently been 
amended. Utah Legislative Service Ch. 295, §1 (West 2008). 
2
 Former Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2 (West 2004), has been renumbered, as 
cited. Utah Legislative Service Ch. 3, § 350 (West 2008). 
enforcement, violate defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. The trial court's "underlying factual 
findings are reviewed for clear error." State v.Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, ^ 11,100 P.3d 
1222. Its legal conclusions, including its application of the law to the facts, "are 
reviewed non-deferentially for correctness." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 11,103 
P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free 
zone, a second degree felony, and possession of paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a 
class A misdemeanor. R7. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence. R50-43. 
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. R78-77, 86-83; Defendant 
pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, reserving his 
right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. R95-94,102-96,104-03. The 
court sentenced defendant to a one-to-fifteen-year prison term, but stayed the prison 
term pending the resolution of the appeal. R109-08. Defendant timely appealed. 
Ri l l . Defendant moved for a certificate of probable cause, which the court granted. 
R106,110. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
Testimony of Dudley Rowley (defendant's father) 
On May 24,2006, defendant's mother called defendant's parole officer to pick 
her son up. R27:5. As defendant left, he asked his parents to take care of some 
things that were in the bed of his Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck. Id. at 5-7. Mr. 
3
 The facts are taken from the preliminary hearing. R27:3-20. The State 
"recite [s] the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings from the 
suppression hearing." State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, t 1 n.l, 173 P.3d 213 
(citation omitted). 
3 
Rowley then pulled defendant's pickup into the garage, to protect the items in the 
truck bed from the weather. Id. at 4-5. Id. at 7. While in the cab, Mr. Rowley saw in 
a little "open cubby hole" beneath the dashboard a syringe with some kind of 
substance in it and a small porcelain cup containing some kind of substance. Id. at 
5-6. He showed the syringe to his wife, who then opened defendant's bags, which 
were in the bed of the pickup. Id. at 6. In one of them, she found a digital scale. Id. 
Mr. Rowley called the police to turn the items over to them. Id. 
Defendant later called from the jail. Id. at 18. Mr. Rowley confronted 
defendant with their discovery of the drugs he had found in the truck. Id. Mr. 
Rowley did not recall defendant's exact conversation, but defendant did not deny 
that he owned the drugs. Id. at 19. 
The Rowleys had loaned defendant a thousand dollars to buy the truck, 
although defendant had never registered it, nor titled it in any name. Id. at 6. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Rowley considered that the truck belonged to defendant. Id. at 7. 
Mr. Rowley had never driven the truck before this incident. Id. at 18. 
Defendant did not ask his father to get into the truck and move it. Id. 
However, the only way Mr. Rowley could accede to his son's request was to drive it 
into the garage, because he was unable to carry the items. Id. Mr. Rowley did not 
4 
recall that the truck was locked. Id. Following instructions from the police, he 
placed the items he had found back in the truck where he had found them. Id. at 8. 
Testimony of Story Provstgaard 
Deputy Sheriff Story Provstgaard had some history with the Rowley family: 
he had previously investigated a report from Mr. Rowley that defendant might have 
stolen some of Mr. Rowley's checks. R27.8-9. Id. at 9. When the Rowley's 
discovered the drugs in defendant's pickup, they had a telephone conversation with 
him while he was in jail and confronted him with their discovery. Id. at 9 Deputy 
Provstgaard monitored that conversation. Id. at 9-10. Mr. Rowley later called 
Deputy Provstgaard to inquire about what he should do with the drugs. Id. at 10. 
Deputy Provstgaard advised him to leave them where he had found them. Id. 
Deputy Provstgaard drove to the Rowley home. Id. In defendant's truck, he found 
the syringe and a small cup; the substance in the cup field tested positively for 
methamphetamine. Id. at 9,12. The result was confirmed by the crime lab. Id. 
Deputy Provsvtgaard did not ask for defendant's permission to search 
because defendant was in custody at that time. Id. at 11. He did not impound the 
truck. Id. at 12. The Rowley's house is located in a drug-free zone—1000 feet from 
Rock Canyon Park. Id. at 13. 
5 
Testimony of Brandon Rowley 
Defendant testified that the truck belonged to him, that he had owned it for 
five to six months, and that it was titled in his name. R27:15. When he asked his 
father to take care of the things in the bed of the pickup, the truck was locked. Id. 
He did not give anyone, including his father, permission to move his truck, nor did 
he give his father the keys. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly denied his suppression 
motion tinder both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. He argues that the court misapplied 
the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, that defendant's parents 
lacked either actual or apparent authority to consent to the search, and that the 
situation did not present exigent circumstances justifying the search. The Court 
need not consider these arguments because defendant has not also challenged the 
independent and separate basis on which the court denied the motion. Here, 
defendant has not challenged the court's conclusion that the search did not violate 
his rights under the federal and state constitutions because his expectation of 
privacy in the truck was extinguished when his parents entered it, found the 
incriminating drug-tainted paraphernalia, and then revealed their discovery to the 
6 
police. That result has been approved by this Court, following the United States 
Supreme Court. It is also fully supported by the trial court's findings, which 
defendant does not dispute. Failure to attack a trial court's ruling waives the issue 
on appeal and establishes the court's ruling as law of the case, precluding further 
consideration. In the same vein, the Court need not consider defendant's actual and 
apparent authority arguments because the court did not even rule that the search of 
the truck was justified by any form of consent. 
In any event, defendant's plain view and exigent circumstances arguments 
are without merit. Defendant concedes that there was probable cause to search his 
truck because the deputy observed the drug-tainted paraphernalia from a place he 
was lawfully entitled to be. He argues only that there were no exigent 
circumstances justifying entry into the truck. Under the Fourth Amendment, 
however, there is no separate exigency requirement under the automobile exception 
to the warrant requirement. And this Court has recently recognized that the 
automobile exception is no longer premised on a vehicle's mobility. Thus, no 
exigent circumstances were necessary to justify the deputy's entry into defendant's 
truck, even though defendant's parents has secured it inside their garage. 
Defendant's rights were also not violated under article I, section 14. First, case 
law demands that, as a threshold matter, defendant have an expectation of privacy 
7 
in the area searched. Defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in the cab of 
his truck after his parents intruded and made their discoveries known to the police. 
Therefore, the issue of exigent circumstances does not even arise. 
In any case, Utah case law asserting that probable cause and exigent 
circumstances are required to justify a search under the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement is in doubt. That requirement is based only on two plurality 
decisions—Stofe v. Larocco, 794 R2d 460 (Utah 1990) and State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 
1229 (Utah 1996). The Anderson plurality agreed with the Larocco plurality in large 
part because case law from the United States Supreme Court also required that the 
warrantless search of a car be supported by exigent circumstances. Since Anderson, 
however, the Supreme Court has announced that exigent circumstances are no 
longer required to justify a search under the automobile exception. Thus, the 
authority of current Utah law requiring that a warrantless search be supported 
exigent circumstances is now suspect. 
Finally, because Utah's interpretation of article I, section 14 should generally 
follow the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 
the Court should readily conclude that the automobile exception in Utah also entails 
no separate exigency. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANTS TRUCK DID NOT VIOLATE 
EITHER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION OR ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the 
warrantless search of his truck was justified under the federal and state 
constitutions. Aplt. Br. at 8-17. He argues that the trial court misapplied the plain 
view exception to the warrant requirement, that defendant's parents lacked either 
actual or apparent authority to consent to the search, and that the situation did not 
present exigent circumstances justifying the search. Id. This Court should reject 
these arguments because they are variously unresponsive to the legal basis of the 
trial court's ruling denying the suppression motion and are, in any case, without 
merit. 
A. Proceedings below. 
Defendant moved to suppress evidence, alleging that it had been improperly 
discovered by his parents and the police in the cab of his truck in the absence of his 
parents' actual or apparent authority to consent to a search or exigent 
circumstances. R50-43. 
The State argued two theories in response. First, the deputy's discovery of 
drug-tainted paraphernalia did not implicate the search and seizure provision of 
9 
either the federal or state constitutions because it followed a private search by 
defendant's parents. R66-64. Second, the illegal items were discovered by the 
deputy in plain view, and, thus, were not subject to the warrant requirement. R64. 
The trial court denied the motion. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order ("Findings and Conclusions/7 R86-83, at 83) (Addendum A). The court 
found that, while moving defendant's truck into his garage, Mr. Rowley discovered 
a syringe and a small porcelain cup containing a crystalline substance in "an open 
cubby hole in the truck's dash." R85. After Mrs. Rowley found a digital scale in a 
bag in the rear bed of the truck, the Rowleys called the police. Id. Deputy 
Provstgaard told the Rowleys to put the items back where they had found them and 
that he would come to their house to retrieve them. Id. When the deputy arrived, 
Mr. Rowley accompanied him to the garage. Id. Deputy Provstgaard could see the 
syringe and the cup from outside the truck. Id.. He opened the door of the truck 
and seized the syringe and the cup with the crystalline substance and the digital 
scale from the bed of the truck. Id. at 85-84. 
The court also made these factual findings: (1) the Rowleys "acted as private 
citizens and were at no time acting as agents of the Utah County Sheriff's office or 
any other law enforcement agency"; (2) the Rowleys "gave voluntary consent for 
Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard to enter their garage, where defendant's truck was 
10 
parked"; and (3) "[t]he syringe and small porcelain cup with the crystalline 
substance were located in the plain view of Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard from a place 
he was entitled to be." R85. 
The court made the following conclusions of law: 
1. The syringe, the small porcelain cup with crystalline 
substance and the digital scales discovered by Mr. and Mrs. Rowley, as 
private citizens, does not fall within the scope of the prohibition 
against unreasonable search and seizure contained in the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article One, Section 
Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution. 
2. The presence of Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard in Mr. and Mrs. 
Rowleys garage was occasioned by voluntary consent and thus is 
outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State 
Constitution. 
3. The "plain view" discovery of the syringe and small porcelain 
cup with crystalline substance that was taken into custody by Deputy 
Provstgaard falls under the recognized exceptions to the requirement 
of a warrant under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State 
Constitution. 
4. Therefore, there was no violation of defendant's rights against 
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article One, Section Fourteen of the 
Utah State Constitution. 
R84-83. 
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B. The trial court correctly denied defendant's suppression motion. 
1. Because defendant has not challenged the primary basis for 
the trial court's ruling, this Court should summarily affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's suppression motion. 
The Court should summarily affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's 
suppression motion because defendant on appeal has not challenged a separate and 
sufficient basis for the court's ruling. 
It is well established that an appellant's, failure to challenge a trial court's 
ruling on appeal establishes the court's ruling as the law of the case, precluding 
further judicial review of the matter. State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 1228,1229 (Utah 
App. 1992) (citing Tracy v. University of Utah Hosp^ 619 P.2d 340, 341 (Utah App. 
1980) ("Where . . . any other final ruling or order of the trial court, goes 
unchallenged by appeal, such becomes the law of the case, and is not thereafter 
subject to later challenge."). See also State v. Ellis, 356 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,9-10 (Utah 
App. 1998) (appellate court bound by earlier decision under law of the case 
doctrine). See also State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122,124 (Utah App. 1991) (declining to 
address a state constitutional challenge to a search where defendant had failed had 
failed to brief or argue state constitutional guarantees at either the pretrial hearing 
or on appeal);."); Pasquin v. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 2454 21,988 P.2d 1 ("Appellant, 
12 
by failing to raise, brief, or argue the issue on appeal, waived any challenge to trial 
court's additional [ basis for] ruling on summary judgment ") 
In the proceedings below, the State's principal argument, independently 
justifying the warrantless entry into defendant's truck, was that Deputy 
Provstgaard's discovery of the drug-tainted paraphernalia stemmed from a private 
search, unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. R66-64 (citing State v. Watts, 750 
P.2d 1219,1220-21 (Utah 1988)) (additional citations omitted). Defendant did not 
reply to this argument. In denying defendant's suppression motion, the trial court 
specifically found that the Rowleys "acted as private citizens and were at no time 
acting as agents of the Utah County Sheriff's office or any other law enforcement 
agency." R85. The court evidently agreed with the State's primary reason for 
denying defendant's suppression motion: the illegal items "discovered by Mr. and 
Mrs. Rowley, as private citizens, does [sic] not fall within the scope of the 
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure contained in the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article One, Section Fourteen of 
Defendant nowhere challenges this basis for the denial of his motion. 
Accordingly, this Court should summarily affirm the trial court's ruling denying his 
13 
suppression motion.4 Sterger, 808 P.2d at 124; State v. Emmet, 839 P.2d 781,786 (Utah 
1992) (refusing to reach remaining issues where another resolves appeal, unless 
remaining issues may arise on retrial). In any case, the court's conclusion was 
correct. 
2, After frustration of an original expectation of privacy occurs, 
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of 
the now-nonprivate information. 
In United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,119,104 S.Ct. 1652,1660 (1984), the 
United States Supreme Court held that the 'Viewing of what a private party had 
freely made available for his inspection did not violate the Fourth Amendment." 
In Jacobsen, Federal Express employees at an airport discovered a package that 
had been damaged during shipping. 466 U.S. at 111, 104 S. Ct. at 1655. In 
accordance with the company's policy regarding insurance claims, the employees 
opened the package to examine its contents and found inside a ten-inch tube 
containing four plastic baggies of white powder. Id. The employees notified the 
In converse fashion, defendant apparently challenges a ruling the trial court 
never made. As he did below, defendant argues that his parents did not have 
common authority of the truck to consent to the deputy's search. R50-45; Aplt. Br. at 
12-14. The trial court, however, made no findings or conclusions on this theory, nor 
did it rely on amy mode of consent in concluding that the deputy's entry into the 
truck was legally justified. R86-83. Accordingly, the State does not address this 
argument. 
14 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and replaced the package contents 
roughly as they found them. Id. When the DEA agent arrived, he took the tube out 
of the box, removed the plastic baggies from the tube, and identified the white 
powder as cocaine by field testing a sample from each baggie. Id. at 111-12,104 S. 
Ct. at 1655. After agents performed a second field test, they rewrapped the package, 
secured a search warrant for the place to which the package was addressed, 
executed the warrant, and arrested the defendants. Id. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal agents' removal of the baggies 
from the package and testing of the cocaine "did not infringe any constitutionally 
protected privacy interest that had not already been frustrated as the result of 
private conduct/7 Id. at 126,104 S. Ct. at 1663. The Court first observed that the 
Fourth Amendment "is wholly inapplicable 'to a search or seizure, even an 
unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the 
Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official/" 
Id. at 113-14, 104 S. Ct. at 1656 (citation omitted). The Court then held that the 
private individual may reveal that information to police without implicating the 
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 117,104 S. Ct. at 1658. The Court explained that "[o]nce 
frustration of the original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit governmental use of the now-nonprivate information." Id. The 
15 
Court further explained that "[t]he Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the 
authorities use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy has not 
already been frustrated/' Id. at 117,104 S. Ct. at 1658-59. 
Relying on Jacobsen, this Court upheld an official search of a briefcase after 
law enforcement was informed by private individuals that they had discovered 
child pornography in the briefcase. State v. Miller, 2004 UT App 445, f % 2-3104 P.3d 
1272. In Miller, employees of a company from which Miller leased a truck came 
across what they believed was child pornography in the cab of Miller's truck. Id. at 
\ 2. They found the illicit materials inside Miller's briefcase, which was fitted with 
combination locks and wrapped aroimd with tape. Id. A police officer, responding 
to the company's call, was given the briefcase and told that it contained child 
pornography. Id. at | 3. He opened the briefcase and reviewed some of the 
photographs. Id. 
Miller was charged with ten counts of child pornography. Id at Tf 4. He 
moved to suppress the photographs found in the briefcase, as well as others found 
in a search incident to arrest, arguing that the officer's search of the briefcase 
exceeded the scope of the employees' search. Id. at f f 4,11. The trial court denied 
Miller's motion to suppress, and he was convicted at trial on all counts. Id. at 4. 
16 
On appeal, this Court held that the leasing company's employees were 
"private actors, and by opening the briefcase and viewing the materials inside, 
[defendant's expectation of privacy in the viewed materials was extinguished. Id. at 
t 10 (citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115, 120, 104 S. Ct. 1652). Consequently, 
governmental use of the information was not prohibited. Id. The Court also held 
that because the police officer viewed fewer photographs than viewed by the leasing 
company's employees, the official search did not exceed the scope of the private 
search. Id. at f 15. See id. at 1 9 ("'[T]he Government may not exceed the scope of 
the private search unless it has the right to make an independent search/7') (quoting 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S at 116,104 S. Ct. 1652). 
Here, the trial court concluded that the drug-tainted paraphernalia and the 
digital scales "discovered by Mr. and Mrs. Rowley, as private citizens, does [sic] not 
fall within the scope of the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure 
contained in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 
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One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution/7 R84.5 In support of this 
conclusion, the court found the following facts: (1) the Rowleys were private actors 
who at no time acted as agents of law enforcement (R84); (2) while inside 
defendant's truck, Mr. Rowley found the drug-tainted paraphernalia in an open 
cubby hole in the truck's dashboard (R85); (3) Mrs. Rowley found a digital scale in 
one of defendant's bags in the rear bed of the truck (id.) (4) after speaking with 
Deputy Provstgaard, the Rowleys, on the deputy's directions, put the items back 
where he had found them (id.)} (4) when the Deputy Provstgaard arrived, Mr. 
Rowley accompanied him to the garage, from where the deputy could see the drug-
tainted paraphernalia in plain view (id. at 85-84); (5) Deputy Provstgaard opened the 
door of the truck and seized the drug-tainted paraphernalia; he also seized the 
digital scale from the rear bed of the truck (id.). Defendant does not dispute any of 
5
 By failing to address the trial court's private- actor rationale for denying his 
suppression motion, defendant has waived any claim that the an analysis under 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution should differ from a Fourth 
Amendment analysis. See State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, f 21 n.2, 57 P.3d 1052 ("The 
parties have not argued for a separate analysis under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution, and therefore, we address the issue only under the federal 
constitution."); State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah App. 1994) (stating that "an 
appellate court can decline to address state constitutional claims under article I, 
section 14 if the party 'fails to proffer any explanation as to how this court's analysis 
should differ' under this section from the federal counterpart.") (citation omitted). 
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the trial court's findings, nor that the discovery of the illegal items constituted 
probable cause that he had committed the crimes charged. Aplt. Br. at 9. 
The court's conclusion that the search and seizure of the illegal items were not 
subject to the protections of the federal and state constitutions is especially well-
founded under Jacobsen and Miller: the official search and seizure of illegal items, 
found by law enforcement was justified because it not only stemmed from and was 
within the scope of discovery of the items by private persons, but the search 
involved entry into space with a decreased expectation of privacy. Compare Jacobsen, 
466 U.S. at 111, 104 S. Ct. at 1655 ("Letters and other sealed packages are in the 
general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of 
privacy/') with California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,391,105 S.Ct. 2066 (1985) (holding 
persons have a "decreased expectation of privacy" in an automobile). 
Here, the Deputy Provstgaard entered into space with a deceased expectation 
of privacy when he opened the door of defendant's truck, which he knew from 
private parties—defendant's parents— contained illict materials, and seized them. 
Further, unlike law enforcement in Jacobsen and Miller, Deputy Provstgaard also saw 
the illicit materials in plain view before he even entered the truck. In short, without 
necessary recourse to any other rationale, the trial court correctly denied 
defendant's motion to suppress under the private-actor theory set out above. In any 
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event, the court correctly ruled that the official search of defendant's truck was 
justified under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. 
C. Neither the federal nor state constitutions require a separate 
exigency to justify the search of an automobile. 
Defendant argues that the court incorrectly concluded that the search was 
justified under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement of both the 
federal and state constitutions. Aplt. Br. at 14-17. Defendant concedes that the 
contraband found inside his truck was clearly incriminating and in plain view— 
thus establishing probable cause—but argues that the deputy's entry into the truck 
was not justified by exigent circumstances. Aplt. Br. at 9-11, 14-17. Under the 
circumstances of this case, that argument is groundless under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States constitution and untenable under article I, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. 
1. The Fourth Amendment does not require a separate exigency 
for the automobile exception. 
Defendant argues that Deputy Provstgaard improperly searched his truck 
because, although there was probable cause of criminal activity, there were no 
exigent circumstances. Aplt. Br. at 14-17. In all but name, he advances this 
argument as an instance in which the automobile exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement fails to justify a warrantless search for lack of 
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exigent circumstances. Id. (citing State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229,1236 (Utah 1996) 
("[I]n 1991, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the requirements of 
probable cause and exigent circumstances as a precondition to a valid warrantless 
search of an automobile/') (citing California v. Acevdo, 500 U.S.565, 569, 111 S. 
Ct.1982,1985-86) (1991)).6 This argument is meritless under current law. 
Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, law 
enforcement officers must obtain a warrant before conducting a search. See U.S. 
Const, amend. IV. "However, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement 
provides that '"[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it 
contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment... permits police to search the vehicle 
without more/ , , , , State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, If 13,173 P.3d 213 (quoting 
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465,467,119 S.Ct. 2013 (1999) (per curiam)) (omission in 
original) (additional citation omitted). Commenting on the present scope of the 
If this Court determines that defendant did not advance his argument under 
the automobile exception, the Court may nevertheless consider that theory as an 
alternative ground to affirm the trial court's ruling. "[A]n appellate court may 
affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory 
apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated 
by the trial court to be the basis for its ruling or action/" State v. Johnson, 2008 UT 
App 5, f 21,178 P.3d 915 (citation omitted). As set out above, the record readily 
supports application of the automobile exception under the Fourth amendment. 
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automobile exception, the Despain court recognized that the United States Supreme 
Court had rejected the rule defendant in this case urges on appeal: 
Utah courts [had] concluded that a warrantless search of a vehicle was 
not proper unless there was both probable cause to believe that the 
vehicle contained contraband and exigent circumstances indicating a 
likelihood that the evidence may be destroyed or lost if not 
immediately seized More recently, however, federal law has been 
clarified. The United States Supreme Court has now unequivocally 
stated that "under [its] established precedent, the 'automobile 
exception' has no separate exigency requirement/' Dyson, 527 U.S. at 
466,119 S.Ct. 2013. 
Id. at % 14 (brackets added in citation) (citations omitted). 
The Despain court also recognized that"' [e]ven in cases where an automobile 
[is] not immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use 
as a readily mobile vehicle justifiefs] application of the vehicular exception.'" Id. at 
115 (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,391,105 S.Ct. 2066 (1985)). Indeed, 
the exception applies "even after it has been impounded and is in police custody." 
Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259,261 (1982) (per curiam) (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 
399 U.S. 42 (1970)). See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S .Ct. 2523 (1973) 
(allowing a warrantless search when the mobility of the automobile was clearly not 
present because the automobile had been towed to a garage following an accident); 
United States v. Paredes, 388 F.Supp.2d 1185,1195-96 (D. Hawaii 2005) ("even after 
[defendant's] car had been towed to a private garage, the automobile exception still 
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permitted law enforcement personnel to conduct a warrantless search-provided that 
the officers had probable cause to conduct the search"). In short, the warrantless 
search of an automobile, supported by probable cause of criminal activity, is 
allowed because a warrant would not provide significant protection of a defendant's 
Fourth Amendment interests. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,831,102 S. Ct. 
2157 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Here, defendant concedes that Deputy Provstgaard had probable cause of 
defendant's criminal activity, based on the deputy's plain view of the incriminating 
items inside defendant's truck from the deputy's rightful position within the 
Rowleys' garage. Aplt. Br. at 9-10. Noihing more was required under the Fourth 
Amendment automobile exception to justify the search of defendant's truck and the 
seizure of the illegal items. 
2. Defendant's claim under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution fails as a threshold matter because defendant's 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the cab of his truck was 
extinguished after his parents entered it and revealed its 
incriminating contents to law enforcement 
Defendant also argues that, given the absence of exigent circumstances, the 
search of his truck violated his rights under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
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Constitution. Aplt. Br. at 14-15 In support, he cites Anderson and State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). In Larocco , a plurality of the Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that probable cause and exigent circumstances were required to justify a 
warrantless search of an automobile under article I, section 14. Id. at 470. A 
different plurality agreed with the result in Anderson, but for a different reason. 910 
P.2d at 1237. Neither case supports defendant's claim. 
In Larocco, the defendant took a car from an auto sales lot and did not return 
it. 794 P.2d at 461. Two years later, the police found what appeared to be the stolen 
car in front of Larocco's home. Id. Further investigation that day showed that the 
car was registered to Larocco. Id. A week later, police returned to Larocco's home 
and found the car still parked. Id. They examined the vehicle identification number 
("VIN") on the dashboard through the windshield and found that, although it 
matched the VIN on Larocco's official registration records, it did not match that of 
Defendant also cursorily argues in conclusion that "[I]f a search or seizure 
violates the . . . Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution, any evidence obtained as a 
result of such illegality must be excluded." Aplt. Br. at 17. In support, he cites State 
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,786 (Utah 1991). The Court should decline to consider the 
claim because it is inadequately briefed. ." See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 
(Utah 1998) ("It is well established that a reviewing court will not address 
arguments that are not adequately briefed.) (citing State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 
966 (Utah 1989) (declining to rule on issue where defendant's brief "wholly lacked 
legal analysis and authority to support his argument")). In an event, as discussed 
below, the exclusionary rule should not be applied. 
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the stolen car. Id. The officers then, without a warrant, opened the unlocked door 
and examined the VTN on the safety sticker on the inside edge of the door. Id. This 
VIN differed from that on the dashboard, but matched that of the stolen car. Id. The 
court of appeals upheld the trial court's denial of Larocco's suppression motion, 
holding that, because Larocco had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN 
under federal law, no search within the meaning of the Fourth amendment had 
taken place. Id. at 464. 
A plurality of the Utah Supreme Court reversed this holding. Id. at 471. The 
plurality wrote that, because federal search and seizure cases were so inconsistent in 
applying the Fourth amendment in automobile searches, it was constrained to 
resolve the case under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, to simplify 
search and seizure rules. Id. at 465-69 (Durham, J., joined by Zimmerman, J.).8 
Accordingly, the plurality announced that it would "continue to use the concept of 
an expectation of privacy as a suitable threshold criterion for determining whether 
article I, section 14 is applicable." Id. at 469. "Then if article I section 14 applies, 
warrantless searches will be permitted only where they satisfy their traditional 
justification, namely to protect the safety of police or the public or to prevent the 
8
 Justice Stewart concurred in the result. Id. at 473. Justice Howe joined 
Justice Hall, who dissented. Id. at 473-74. 
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destruction of evidence/' Id. at 469-70 (citations omitted). The plurality then noted 
that historically it had required both probable cause and exigent circumstances in 
warrantless vehicle searches under article I, section 14. Id. at 470 (citations omitted). 
The plurality concluded that because there was no indication that Larocco had been 
alerted to police presence, there was no exigency. Id. at 470-71. The plurality thus 
held that the opening of the car door to inspect the VIN constituted an unreasonable 
search under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 470-71. 
As noted, the Larocco decision did not command a majority. Therefore, it is 
not controlling. But even if controlling, Larocco does not support defendant's claim 
because defendant cannot meet Larocco's threshold requirement: he had no 
expectation of privacy because it was extinguished when his parents intruded into 
his otherwise constitutionally protected space. Aple. Br. at IB2; Miller, 2004 UT App 
445, Tf 10. Thus, under Larocco, the Court does not proceed to the next question, i.e., 
whether the search was precluded by the absence of a separate exigency. 
In Anderson, a different plurality reaffirmed the Larocco plurality's view that 
the automobile exception requires a separate exigency under article I, section 14. 
910 P.2d at 1237 (Russon, J., joined by Howe, J.).9 It did so, however, from a 
9
 Justice's Stewart and Zimmerman separately concurred in the result. Id. at 
1239-41. Justice Durham concurred and dissented. Id. at 1241-42. 
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different perspective. The Anderson plurality recognized that the court had 
" endeavored toward uniformity in the application of the search and seizure 
requirements of the state and federal constitutions/7 id. at 1235 (emphasis added). 
After reviewing relevant Fourth Amendment law, the plurality concluded that the 
warrantless search of an automobile must be "premised on probable cause and 
exigent circumstances/' Id. at 1236-37 (citing Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569, 111 S. Ct. at 
1985-86). Thus, the Anderson plurality wrote, "\b]ecause this portion of Larocco 
coincides with federal law, we agree with those who joined the Larocco plurality that 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution requires that warrantless searches of 
automobiles be justified by a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances/' 
Id. at 1237 (emphasis added). 
The joining of the Larocco and Anderson pluralities constitutes a doubtful 
concensus, given the Anderson plurality's rationale for joining the Larocco plurality 
and the subsequent clarification of the law since Anderson. The Anderson plurality 
joined the Larocco plurality because it was predisposed to follow federal 
constitutional law and because developments in that law agreed with the Larocco 
plurality's insistence on exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless vehicle 
search. Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1237. Since Anderson issued, however, the United 
States Supreme Court has clarified that a search under "'the automobile exception 
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has no separate exigency requirement/" Despain, 2007 UT App 367, If 14 (quoting 
Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467, 119 S. Ct. 2013). Thus, to the extent that the Anderson 
plurality agreed with the Larocco plurality's view based on the status of federal 
constitutional law, that agreement is now suspect. Consequently, the rule that the 
Utah automobile exception requires probable cause and exigent circumstance is also 
suspect. In short, there exists no substantial basis that the deputy's search in this 
case was precluded under article I, section 14: not only did defendant lack a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the cab of his truck, but also the Utah 
Constitution does not clearly require the existence of a separate exigency before law 
enforcement conducts a warrantless search of an automobile. 
This Court should not, in any event, interpret section 14 differently than it 
does the Fourth Amendment. "It is a cardinal rule of construction that 
constitutions should be construed in light of their framers' intent." American Fork v. 
Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1985). In discerning that intent, the Utah 
Supreme Court has considered a variety of sources. "[T]he starting point," of 
course, "should always be the plain meaning of the textual language." American 
Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, % 115, 140 P.3d 1235 (Durham, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); accord State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, f^ 
37, 162 P.3d 1106. Where the plain language of the provision is inadequate to 
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discern the framers' intent, the Court has looked to the common law, the historical 
source of the provision, similar provisions in the federal and sister state 
constitutions, the official report of Utah's constitutional convention, statutory law in 
effect at the time of the convention, relevant historical state traditions, and other 
related state constitutional provisions. See Crosgrove, 701 P.2d at 1072; West v. 
Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999,1015 (Utah 1994); State v. Robertson, 924 P.2d 889, 
891-92 (Utah 1996); PIE. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144,1148 
(Utah 1988). In a few cases, the Court has also indicated a willingness to consider 
"policy arguments in the form of economic and sociological materials." Soc'y of 
Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916,921 n.6 (Utah 1993); Tiedemann, 2007 UT 
49, at Tf 37. 
The Court in Whitehead explained that "[e]ach of these types of evidence can 
help in divining the intent and purpose of the framers, a critical aspect of any 
constitutional interpretation." Whitehead, 870 P.2d at 921 n.6 (emphasis added). In 
other words, despite its expressed willingness to look at non-textual or non-
historical evidence, Whitehead, like its progenitors, viewed "divining the intent and 
purpose of the framers" as the ultimate purpose for looking at those sources. But see 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, at Tf 37 (holding that courts may "rely on whatever 
assistance legitimate sources may provide in the interpretive process," but not 
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limiting that review to divining the intent of the framers). As explained by Justice 
Durrant in American Bush, such an approach "is the most appropriate interpretive 
course to follow when confronted with constitutional questions/' American Bush, 
2006 UT 40, at f 86 (Durrant, J., concurring). It "provides stability to state 
government while remaining true to the principle that it is the people of this state 
who should ultimately determine how our society should be structured[jsG2]." Id. at 
\ 84; accord Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary 
Rules Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 751, 774-80 
(1993) (endorsing an "historically-based" approach that incorporates neutral 
principles). 
In dicta, the Utah Supreme Court has observed that Section 14 "often provides 
greater protections than the Fourth Amendment, despite nearly identical language." 
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, If 16,164 P.3d 397. In reality, however, the Court has 
found greater protections only on rare occasions. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 810 
P.2d 415,418 (Utah 1991) (holding that section 14 recognizes a privacy interest in 
bank records); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) 
(concluding that police were required to obtain warrant before opening door of 
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stolen car to inspect the VIN). This case should not be added to that select list. 
Indeed, an examination of the historical genesis of section 14 evidences the framers7 
intent to provide protections that are identical to those afforded under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Many cite to the antipolygamy raids as support for the proposition that the 
framers intended to provide greater protections under section 14. But those events 
do not support that proposition. The complaint of Utah's settlers was not that the 
Fourth Amendment was inadequate, but that it was disregarded. See generally 
Tracey E. Panek, Search and Seizure in Utah: Recounting the Antipolygamy Raids, 64 
Utah Hist. Qtly 316-34gsG3] (1994). Thus, when adopting the Utah Constitution, the 
framers included a declaration of rights patterned after the federal Bill of Rights. See 
Utah Const, art. I. Although the framers looked to the 44 other state constitutions in 
drafting a declaration of rights, "[t]he inspiration behind the declaration of rights 
came from the great parent bill of rights framed by the fathers of our country." 1 
Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention 102 (Star Printing 
Co. 1898); 2 Official Report 1847. 
10
 In State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, 996 P.2d 546, the Court analyzed an 
administrative traffic checkpoint under the Utah Constitution, but adopted the 
approach taken by the United States Supreme Court. 
31 
Where the framers found the federal rights lacking in clarity or substance, 
they modified them. See, e.g. Utah Const art. I, § 4 (detailing principles of 
separation of church and state), § 9 (adding unnecessary rigor clause), § 6 (clarifying 
that right to bear arms is for security and defense, but may be regulated), § 10 
(identifying number of jurors and proportion required for a verdict), § 12 (adding 
right to appeal and spousal privilege), § 15 (detailing free speech right), § 22 (adding 
that private property may not be damaged without just compensation). Others 
rights they left relatively untouched. See, e.g. Utah Const, art. I, § 5 (tracking 
language in U.S. Const, art. I, § 9, cl. 2), § 7 (tracking Fourteenth Amendment), § 14 
(tracking Fourth Amendment). As to those, it reasonably can be assumed that the 
framers intended they be accorded the same meaning as their federal counterpart. 
See Paul G. Cassell, Search and Seizure and the Utah Constitution: The Irrelevance of the 
Antipoligamy Raids, 1995 BYU L. Rev, 1,2-10 (1995). Indeed, the language of Section 
5 was expressly modified to track the language of article I, section 9 of the United 
States Constitution, so that it would not be considered "in a different way/' 1 
Official Proceedings 257. Because Section 14 is nearly identical to the Fourth 
Amendment, this Court should presume that Section 14 mirrors the Fourth 
Amendment unless there is evidence to suggest it provides greater protections 
(interstitial approach utilizing a mirroring presumption). 
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Although the interstitial approach to state constitutional interpretation 
supports the conclusion that Section 14 rights are coterminous with Fourth 
Amendment rights, the same cannot be said with respect to the remedy for a 
violation of those rights. The Larocco plurality concluded that "exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 
14." Larocco, 794 P.2d at 460. But several factors dictate against that conclusion. 
First, the language of Section 14 does not call for exclusion of evidence. See Utah 
Const, art. I, § 14; Cassell, The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. at 807-12. Second, 
most states at the time did not impose an exclusionary rule. Cassell, The Utah 
Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. at 800-05. Third, the common law did not embody an 
exclusionary rule. See id. at 806-07. Fourth, the first Utah legislature did not require 
exclusion of evidence for unreasonable searches and seizures, but imposed criminal 
sanctions instead. See id. at 809-12. And fifth, the prevailing traditions of the time 
do not support exclusion. See id. at 812-14, 819-22. While this Court may not 
overrule the Utah Supreme Court's adoption of a state exclusionary rule, the 
historical context of Section 14 does not provide a basis for the Court to extend the 
exclusionary rule, as requested by Defendant. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted July 29,2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTOP 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
BRANDON ROWLEY 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 061402245 
JUDGE: STEVEN L. HANSEN 
COMES NOW THE COURT, having been fully informed as to the relevant facts in this 
matter and hereby makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. After being arrested on May 24, 2006, Defendant, Brandon Rowley left his Chevrolet 
S-10 Pickup truck parked in front of his parents residence in Saratoga Springs, UT. 
2. Defendant's truck was registered in his name only and he had owned the truck for 5-6 
months prior to his arrest. 
3. Before being taken to jail, Defendant asked his father, Mr. Dudley Rowley to take care 
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of the things that were in the back of his truck. 
4. Defendant did not ask his parents to move the truck, but after defendant was taken to 
jail, Mr. Dudley Rowley obtained the keys from defendant's bedroom and moved the truck inside 
his garage at his residence to protect it from the weather. 
5. While moving the truck, Mr. Dudley Rowley discovered a syringe and a small 
porcelain cup that had a crystalline substance in it, inside the pickup truck in an open cubby hole 
in the truck's dash. 
6. Thereafter, Mrs. Rowley, the defendant's mother found a digital scale in a bag located 
in the back bed of the pickup truck. 
7. Mr. and Mrs. Rowley informed the defendant of what they had found during a 
telephone conversation with him. After this telephone conversation, Mr. Rowley called Deputy 
Sheriff Story Provstgaard and reported finding the items. Deputy Provstgaard requested the 
Dudley's to put the items back where they had been found and then stated he would come to pick 
them up. 
8. Deputy Provstgaard went to the Rowley residence in Saratoga Springs and was 
accompanied to the garage area by Mr. Rowley, where defendant's truck was parked. 
9. Mr. Rowley showed Deputy Provstgaard the location of the syringe and the porcelain 
cup with the crystalline substance. Deputy Provstgaard could see these items from outside the 
truck. 
10. Deputy Provstgaard opened the truck door, entered the truck and took custody of the 
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syringe and porcelain cup with crystalline substance from the inside of the truck cab and the 
digital scales from the back bed of the truck. 
11. Mr. and Mrs. Rowley acted independently as private citizens and were at no time 
acting as agents of the Utah County Sheriffs office or any other law enforcement agency. 
12. Mr. and Mrs. Rowley gave voluntary consent for Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard to enter 
their garage, where defendant's truck was parked. 
13. The syringe and small porcelain cup with the crystalline substance were located in 
the plain view of Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard from a place he was entitled to be. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The syringe, the small porcelain cup with crystalline substance and the digital scales 
discovered by Mr. and Mrs. Rowley, as private citizens, does not fall within the scope of the 
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure contained in the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution or Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution. 
2. The presence of Deputy Sheriff Provstgaard in Mr. and Mrs. Rowley's garage was 
occasioned by voluntary consent and thus is outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution. 
3. The "plain view" discovery of the syringe and small procelain cup with crystalline 
substance that was taken into custody by Deputy Provstgaard falls under the recognized 
exceptions to the requirement of a warrant under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution 
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4. Therefore, there was no violation of defendant's rights against unreasonable search 
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article One, 
Section Fourteen of the Utah State Constitution, 
ORDER 
The defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby DENIED. 
, 2007. 
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Dated this 
Approved 
STEVEN 
FOURTH DISTRIC| 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and accurate copy of the foregoing document to 
Gunda Jarvis, Utah County Public Defender Association, 51 South University Ave., Suite 206, 
Provo, Utah 84601, on April 3,2007. 
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